*By Sotiris Kyprianou
In every serious country, a long-term energy plan is made every year, which is based on the ability of the country’s electricity system to meet consumer demand, especially during peak hours. That is, it is based on the energy efficiency of the system. In Cyprus, in practice, this coherent plan does not seem to exist.
The specific plan also includes the long-term policies that each state wants to promote and plans the next steps that must be taken in the energy sector, in order not to run out of electricity at the lowest price in simple words. Our country’s energy policy, however, has revolved around three “lines of defense” in recent years.
First, the advent of natural gas. For years, all the eggs went into that basket. Investments were made, with the assumption that the fuel would be here “soon”. Today, however, even public positions indicate that natural gas for power generation is not expected until either 2026 or 2027. And when the basic assumption is moved two and three years ahead, what about security of supply in the interim? Who fills the gap when the system is “stressed” by heatwaves, old units and increased demand?
secondly, the upgrade of Decelia with new units. Here lies one of the most characteristic examples of “temporal failure”, which turns into financial failure. It had been presented as an emergency solution: about 80MW of new capacity to back up sufficiency until the next day was ripe. The new units ordered for Dekelia, after a €140m bid was awarded, are no longer expected before 2030, as the builder has informed that the delivery time is 4 years instead of 2.5. In other words, a “solution” that should protect the system before the end of the decade, is transferred in time to the point where it loses its role as a tool of adequacy for 2026 and beyond.
And the cost? Here is the second strike. Initial estimates put the project at €80-90 million, but bids moved to €138.5-147 million. This “translation” of time into money is the real problem. Personally, I disagreed with the logic of this choice, as I consider these generators to be and will be unprofitable. At what point, then, does a decision cease to be technical and become a purely political risk? When the cost-time relationship changes so much, who re-evaluates the outcome and who takes responsibility for the re-evaluation? And, most crucially: when the summer of 2026 comes around, what is the immediate “compensation” for the fact that the new power will not be here?
Third, storage. Storage has been presented as a tool that can reduce RES cuts, provide flexibility and support the hours when the sun is down but demand remains high. On paper, the way has been cleared for central administrator batteries to support system security, originally targeted to be completed by June 2026. It sounded good. But 2026 is now and the crucial thing is not the announcements, but when they will work in practice. And here the simple question arises: can we support the adequacy of summer 2026 on projects that are still in progress? If deadlines are missed – which are often missed when there are tenders, approvals, procurement, grid connection – what is the alternative plan?
The second piece is private batteries. There is interest there. There are applications. There are investors who have invested and in some cases have already ordered equipment. However, many projects do not move forward because they get stuck at connection and final approvals. Officially it is said that preliminary terms of connection were given to several, but final terms were not issued because not all documents and studies were filed. However, we are aware that there are companies that have submitted the documents and studies they need, with various scenarios as requested, but the approving administrator believes they are insufficient and wants further investigations/studies.
But an issue arises here, when the same mechanism that evaluates and “unlocks” private projects is simultaneously trying to do its own projects, how is trust protected that there is no distortion and that it is not delaying private storage on purpose? How is it proven that there is no role conflict? What does it look like, in practice, that one project is not promoted at the expense of the other?
In 2025 we already saw the system reaching its limits: on 12 and 13 August 2025 there were controlled cyclical outages in areas of Cyprus due to very high demand and unit failures. This was no “accident”. It was a warning of what adequacy means when reserve is lacking.
And here is the final, simple question: has it been decided, cleanly, what toolbox will keep the system going in 2026? Or shall we go, once again, in the hope that “nothing serious will happen”?
*Energy Advisor