I can’t speak for Turkey, but the four-point methodology that Erhiurman is calling for, as far as I can tell, reflects a “compromise position” adopted by Ankara after the October elections in the occupied territories. Thus, a realistic and workable deal for Turkey in the Cyprus issue would not be a return to the old, open-ended federation talks. Ankara would likely need four guarantees:
First, the political equality of Turkish Cypriots must be substantial and not decorative. Any federal or confederal arrangement should include effective participation, a rotating presidency or equivalent executive balance, and an affirmative vote mechanism on vital issues.
Second, Turkey’s security role cannot simply disappear from day one. A revised guarantee and troop arrangement could be gradual, scaled back and under international monitoring, but Ankara would not accept a system that would leave the Turkish Cypriots dependent solely on the goodwill of the Greek Cypriots.
Third, the Turkish Cypriot side should not be punished again in the event of a failure of the talks. Ankara would like a “failure clause”: if negotiations, within a certain time frame, break down, then the way should be opened for direct trade, flights, sports and cultural contacts for the north, rather than returning to isolation.
Fourth, EU energy, maritime zones, migration and security policy must be part of the package. Turkey will not accept Cyprus turning into a European and NATO bridgehead against Turkish interests, while the Turkish Cypriots will remain excluded from decision-making.
Thus, the most realistic formula is neither pure federation nor formal partition. It is likely to be a partnership based on “sovereign equality”: two politically equal component states, very loose shared institutions, strong internal autonomy, a common international personality where necessary, and structured cooperation with Turkey, Greece, the EU and the UN.